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ABSTRACT
This paper contains a theoretical analysis of and summaries of empirical
information on consequences of wage floors in the labor market imposed by
minimum wages and by labor unions.
Excess supplies are rationed in part probabilistically C'first come,
first served"), and in part systematically——by raising hiring standards,
or by discrimination and nepotism. Effects on employment, unemployment,
and labor force participation, and on wage differentials between the
"covered" and the free sector follow. Empirical information on these ef-
fects is cited in the minimum wage case, but only wage differentials are
analyzed in the union context.
Other consequences outlined here are: lengthening of school attendance,
reduction of hours of work, substitution of paid out wages for fringes in
the minimum wage case. However, union pressure on fringes is greater than
on wages. This strategy produces larger income and greater job security
for union members.
The minimum wage reduces opportunities for job training and consequent
wage growth. Quits initially decline as wages are pushed up, but turnover
is likely to increase as the training content of jobs is reduced. Union
wage and fringe advantages reduce quits significantly. However, training
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It is often claimed that in a world of "administered" prices and
wages, laws of supply and demand are largely abolished. This paper
illustrates the contrary proposition that the usefulness and richness
of supply-demand analysis is never as apparent as when attempts are
made to overrule market forces by decree. The proposition is not novel,
but a comprehensive analysis of theoretical and empirical consequences of
imposed wages or prices is lacking. An attempt is made here to outline
such consequences in the labor market when above-equilibrium wages are
imposed by (1) minimum wage legislation, and (2) by labor unions. The
analysis represents both a guide and an agenda for empirical work
currently under way.
I. Double-crossing the Marshallian Cross
At the basic level of price theory the question is: What
are the demand and supply responses to a double—crossing (above the inter-
section)of the Marhshall.jan cross7Ihe resulting leftward movement on the
demand curveisunderstood by most freshmen, yet its verification and
estimationhas kept researchers busy for over three decades.2 I shall leave
the explanation of this perhaps embarassing illustration of our industry
to historians of thought or of politics. Be it as it may, it took along
time for the analysis to move from effects on the left side to effectson
the right, or supply side of the Marshallian cross.
11n the labor market.
2Iinvestigatingeffects ofminimum wages.In the following outline I briefly review the supply effects as well
as demand effects which go beyond the usual focus on disemployment.
(1) Supply Effects
The standard 'double—cross" analysis as described in elementary textbooks
is portrayed in Fig. 1. It shows a decrease of employment from E0 to Em in
response to an increase in wages from W0 to Wm. It also shows that the induced
excess supply (unemployment) EL is larger than the reduction in employment EoEm.
Note that the alleged expansion of supply from E0 (=L0) to L, also implies a
tendency for wages to rise in the "free" or non-covered sector.
These conclusions on the supply side are theoretically unwarranted and
4
empirically false. The basic reason is that supply responds not only to the wage,
but also to the probability of employment. Abstracting from frictional unemploy-
ment, the probability of employment is unity in equilibrium, and S is a locus
of equilibrium points traced out by shifting D's. Since a reduction of vacancies
lowers the probability of employment, the quantity of labor supplied will be
less than L at
The more interesting question, however, is not whether the supply of labor
will be less than L, but whether it will be increased (to L1) or decreased (to L)
from the previous level L0(=E0).
Wage increases make covered jobs more attractive, but demand for workers
in such jobs is reduced, so the probability of finding a job in them is reduced.
Thus it is not clear a priori whether labor moves, on balance, toward or away
from the covered sector. It can be expected to move out of the covered sector
1The 'standard" analysis is correct in the case of farmpricesupports. But
this is only because the government stands ready to L&yupthe surpluses,















iftheorobability of employment in it falls by a larger percentage than the
increase in the wage (abstracting from risk preferences). Labor moves into
the sector in the opposite case.1
Outward mobility widens the wage differential between the covered and
not—covered labor groups, while mobility toward the covered sector reduces
it, but can never eliminate it.Unemploymentarises in both cases. ttis
larger than the reduction in employment when labor is attracted tothecovered
sector, it is wailer when labor moves out of it.
Whenthe excess supply, resulting from above—equilibrium wages is rationed
probabilistically, it can be shown (Mincer, 1976) that outward movement (and
reduction in the not—covered wages) occurs when the vacancy rate in the covered
sector is wailer than the demand elasticity in it. pirica]. work (ibid) indicates
that increasein the minimi wage and in its coverage result in outflows from
the covered into the not—covered sector and out of the labor force. Increases
in unemployment, attributable to the wage hikes or to increases in coverage are
therefore smaller (about 1/31 than the decrease in employment.
An interesting implication of the observed supply responses is an increase
inthe rateof returnto furtherschooling for youngsters at therelevantwage
levels(starting wages of high school or less than high school graduates). The
observed labor force outflowsfrom the covered sector indicate a deterioration
of labormarketprospects for job searchers in both sectors. Consequently, the
opportunity costs of further schooling declines. That the observed lengthening
of school enrollments at the high-school and junior college levels is associated
with hikes in minimum wages was shown by Matilla in two recent papers (1978, 1979)
l. Effects of increased costs on relative product prices maymitigatetheflows
on the labor market, but are not likely to cancel or reverse them.4
It is worth notingthatthe question of effects of minimum wages on welfare
enrollmentsis1 in principle, analogous to the question about effects on school
enrol3..ment. A priori, one could argue either way.. Indeed, one of thearguments
in favor of minimum wages is that they create an inducement to leave welfare
for more attractive paid work. 3ut the evidence on labor force participation




Inthe presence of excess supply, jobs are rationed,
atleast in part, probabilist±cal2.y; the reduction in vacancies deters some
of the excess supply and creates a queue of job searchers. 8eyond that the
increase in wages creates incentives for employers to ration jobs byscreening
out less productive workers so as to reduce the increase in labor costsper
efficiency units This can be viewed as part of the process of substitution
of capital (human or nonhuman) for labor, in response to changes in relative
factor prices. Alternatively, or additionally, excess supply also creates
opportunities for discrimination and nepotism. Rationing by such changes in
hiring standards reduces the unemployment queue arid increases the likelihood
of ouigration from the covered sector. If rationing involves upgrading of
Wachterand Kim (1979) claim that increases in both welfare generosity and
minimum wage and coverage levels occurred at about the same time in recent
years. The effects appear to reinforce one another, rather than cancel,
which, prima facie supports our inference.5
hiring standards, the wage gap between the covered and uncovered sector is
overstated by quality components which may be difficult to measure.
The empirical evidence on the nature of job rationing is not clear. The
apparent substitution of white students for less educated black youngsters in
jobs at the minimum wage level may reflect job rationing by quality or by dis-
crimination. But it may also be due to the fact that a higher wage level or new
coverage represents a larger wage increase for blacks than for whitesr which re-
suits in greater disemployment of blacks.
() Disemplôyment: NumberE or aours?
Does the reduction in the demand for labor induce primarily a reduction
of nbers employed or in hours per worker, This choice
is not a matter of indifference to the employer. To the extent that employment
costs are unrelated to hours of work and are sizable, exogenous increase in
wage rates shift the margin toward reduction of hours per worker rather than
1
disemployment of workers.
At the level of minimum wages, hiring costs are likely to be small. Training
costs may be of some consequence, but as I argue below these are reduced or
eliminated as a result of minimum wages. sours may be reduced in the short
rim if this process of changing the job content takes a long time (Wessels, 1980).
pirical findings on hours of work are both skimpy and mixed. Zucker (1973),
Mixcn E1978) and Wesseis (1980) find small effects, negative and positive, in
low wage industries. Gramlich 1976 finds a rise in part-time work of teen-
agers, but Matilla (1978) suggests that this finding pertains largely to students.
1See equation (1) in Part II, section (3) ,below.6
It may therefore simply reflect the previously reported supply shift from market
to school, rather than a response in the relative demand for hours- vs•numbers.
C.c) Adjusthentsin the Wage Package: Fringes, Trainingam Turnover
If some of the components of the wage package are not subject towage
floors, the? will tend to be reduced to offset some of the increase in labor
costs-. Sere the major items- are so called fringe benefits, largely in the
form of pens-ions and insurance contributions, and trainingexpenses of the
firm.
The minimum wage applies- only to the paid out money wage. Sincewages of
the very young and inexperienced workers are close to the minimumwage, the
effect on training is. potant.tail.y the most important consideration under this
rubric.
Tr-inirig cpenses- of the firm are largely financed by initially lower
wages of trainees. Firms beet' -some of the costs if training prsduce
worker skiLl.s specific to ti'e firm. The minimum wage reduces thescope for
worker training in both cases: Even if current productivity of some of the
employed young workers warrants paying the minimum wage, job training is
precluded or reduced, since its provision would require paying a sub?ninimum
wage.
Thus the labor market difficulties which the minimum wage generates for
low wage young workers are twofold: loss of jobs for some where wages are
initially below the minimum and loss of opportunities for training and careers
even for those whose initial productivity is worth as much or somewhat more than
the minimum wage.7
As already noted, minimum wages tend to discourage. the formation of
general", that is transferableskills, aswell as firm—specific capital,
although the effects on the latter may be weaker to the extent that the firm
is willing to bear costs of training.
Several t'pes of feedback on the supply side may be expected to result
from the barriers• to job training createdbyminimum wages: Those who are
intellectually and financiaLly able to prolong schooling will do so, even if
theirinterests-j axeprarily'vocational and they would have preferred job
training to staying in school. Thus the prolongation of schooling is due to
deterioration of both current job opportunities and of prospects for
advancement.
Onemay speculate that the growth of junior colleges1 as well as the growing
demand forvocationalism in college curriculaispartlya reflection of this
response. And so is also the growing tendency of students to combine school
withmarket work) Student work is also partly encouraged by provision of the Fair
Lor Standards Act which creates subminimum differentials and exceptions for them.
Thetransition to full-time work at wages above the minimumwage hurdleismade
easierby part-period and part-time work while at school. Although jobs of
students are usually low—skilled and casual, they provide some experience and
some measure of financial independence. The "dead—end" nature of many of these
casual jobs creates no particular anxiety, since they will be left behind as
soon as the student has graduated and acguired more rewarding capacities.
This is shown tobe the casein Mattila's work. There are, ofcourse,
additional reasons forthistrend which need not concern us here.8
The early labor market difficulties produced by the minimum wage are not
easily surmounted by youth., who are either unwilling or unable to prolong their
schooling. Since opportunities for job training leading to advancement on the
job are blocked by the minimum wage for some of them, the young school dropouts
must choose jobs with little promise for advancement or become a labor market
dropout as well. Non.participation in the labor market, which is induced by
the minimum wage, may be financed by the family, by unreported market or illegal
activities, or y the welfare system.
The non—students. who do not drop out of the labor market despite their low
productivity must contend with several obstacles: greater difficulties (longer
unemploymentJ in finding jobs. in the covered sector, and lesser growth on the
job because of the reduced availability of training on the job. Although it
may seem strange to assert that higher wages- increase turnover, this can happen
in the longer run when minimum wages- are raised, if firm—specific training is
important in these low!-wage jobs; :ts elimination reduces the cost of turnover
for the worker and for the employer. In the short-run, prior to full adjus1ent,
the effects- on turnover are ambiguous,, since quits are likely to be reduced and
layoffs increased in the covered sector.
-
Wemay s11nr±ze these implications, of minimum wages as follows: Reduced
training on the job leads to reduced pace of job and wage advancement, and to
eventually increased turnover in jobs. which previously contained specific train-
ing opportunities.,9
The hypothesis that minimum wages tend to discourage on the, job training
is largely supportedinthe empirical analysis of Mincer and Leighton CNBER
Wbrk±ng Paper 44]j. Direct effects on reported job training and coroLlary
effects on wage growth were estmated in longitudinal microdata of the NLS and
RSID covering the period 1967—1971, in the NLS and 1973—1975 in the PSI. The
effects were consistantly negative and stronger at lower education levels.
No effectswereobserved in groups- when education exceeds high school. The
effects on turnover, were mixed. it decreased among young NLS whites,and
increased among NLS- blacks and PSIDwhites. W!iethertheseapparentlyconflicting
findings on turnover reflect a distinction between short and long-runadjusents
remains unclear.1
Our procedure relied on differences in wage levels across states for the
"same worker" Cas estimated by. wage functions I and on differences in coverage
among whites to construct the minimum wage variables. Alternative methodologies
used by' M. Hashi.moto (J.980r produced qualitatively similar results on the wage
growth question.
Mixon(1978) found that minimum wages reduce quits in manufacturing industries
in the short run.10
II. The Minimum Wage Model as a Guide to Union Wage Effects
(1) Supply Responses
In contrast to the minimum wage literature the union effects literature tends
tofocus on union—nonunion (n-u)wage differentials rather t1non employment
effects,and even less on unemployment and labor mobility consequences. Does labor
move out of the unionized sector thereby reducing nonunion wages or the opposite?
If mobility is out of the sector the measure of union wage gain is biased upward,
1
if into the sector it is biased downward.The hypothesis one encounters more
frequently in the union literature is that the wage gap is an underestimate of
union wage gains because of the so—called threat effect. The notion is that in
response to increases in union wage rates nonunion firms raise their wages in
order to reduce the probability that a union will organize their employees. This
kind of behavior, if true——and the evidence is not clear, needs to be distinguished
from supply effects.
However, if, as both theory and empirical analyses suggest (Mincer, 1981),
the union wage push leads to selective rather than probabilistic rationing of
jobs, by upgrading of hiring standards or by nepotism and discrimination, labor
moves to the non—union sector in all cases, Consequently, unless offset by
threat effects, wages are reduced the non-union sector, but with the elimina-
tion of queues little unemployment would be observed in the covered sector.
Empirical studies of the effects of unions on non—union wages2 show mixedor
negligible results.This suggests that either supply effects are largely offset
by threat effects, or that the non—union sector is too large relative to the
union sector (80% of labor is not unionized in the U.S.) to show any discernible
supply effects.
1
For a thorough discussion of the difference between wage gain and wage gap,
see Lewis (1963)
2
Freeman and Medoff (1978) ,Donsimoniand Shakotko (1979) ,Kahn(1980).II
The traditional useofthe coverage variable (% unionized) alone can be mis-
leading. Its interpretation as a measure of unionpower to raise wages need not
be correct, if supply effects matter. Forexample, assume that union wage gains
are uncorrelated with coverage, but increasedcoverage results in outward mobility.
Then larger coverage would be associated withlarger u—n wage gaps, but the
interpretation that coverage measures unionpower to raise wages would be
incorrect.
(2)TheWagePush and Mir±ngStandards
In contrast to legislatively imposed minimum wages, unionwagegains are
endogenous to union power, objectives, and conditions-. Their size is noteasy
to determine. This has been a subject of extensive research in the past two
decades. Much of it relies on estimating wage differences between union and
nonunion labor ofotherwisesimilar quality. Since full standardization is never
possible, the estimates. are subject to debate. Available longitudinal data
permit a "before and after"analysis carriedout on the same individuals.
The same analysis permits estimates of selectivity into union job hiring, since
information on prior wages and trainingis available.
Current work with longitudinal micro-data2 indicate that
theone or two—year wage gain of men who move fromnon—unionto union membership
2
Mellow(1981), Mincer l98l)12
significantly exceeds the wage change of others whose tenure or mobility status
(inter-firm or inter-industry) is the same. This gain estimated
between a third to two-thirds of the (standardized)wage differential in the
cross—section.1 The latteraverages about 20%. The remainder can be viewed
as an indirect estimate of the quality adjustment in hiring. Moredirectly,
the fact of selectivity in hiring is seen in thehigher non-union wage (On
the previous job) of new union hires compared to non-unionhires (Mincer, 1981).
The differential between these priorwages is an estimate of the selectivity
component in the cross-sectional Uflion—flOflufliOfl wage differential.
(3) Effects on Hours of Work
If numbers employed (N) and hours per worker (H) are viewed as separate
factors of production, cost minimizing employers will determine their demand for
N and H at the point where the ratio of marginal factor costs is equal to the
ratio of marginal productivities, i.e., the slope of the optimal production
isoquant.
Following Rosen (l9?), the equilibrium marginal factor cost ratio is2
(1)jHF(r+q) MCH N
where F is the fixed cost of employment per worker, amortized per period by r,
the interest costof capital and by q, the worker quit probability which depreciates
the capital sum creating a capital loss Fq per period.
To the extent that F is sizable, an increase in the wage rate W reduces the
factor cost ratio shifting the relative demand away from hours toward numbers.
In the minimum wage case we argued that F is significant at most in terms of
training expenses, but that minimum wages tend to reduce or eliminate such
1
A similar approach by Mellow (1981) applied to a large CPStwo-year panel showed
somewhat smaller union gains. Mellow's data, however, did not permit analysesby
mobility status.
2Let total labor costs be C= NHW +NF (r-+-q), Then MC =dc=HW+ F (r+q)
and MCH=dc
dh13
expenses,so that the predicted effects on hours may be observed only in the
short run before the adjusent is comp1eted or it may be indeterminate.
In the union case, union presaure on wages' extends to most components of
the wage packa9e. Indeed, union push on components other than directly paid
out wages appear to be even stronger. thii'on fringe benefits exceed non!-union
benefits not only in doLlar value but also as a proportion of the wage
package (about 30%). A number of possible explanations have been conjectured,
running from union democracy which favors the older worker to union management
of pension funds as an instrument of power. One economic argument relies on
reduced turnover, which is a result of union wage push and of other gains. In
the presence of incomplete vesting of pensions in the worker, longer tenure
of union members means that the probability of ultimately receiving the. pension
is higher in union than in non—union jobs. ence the incentive to push for larger
pensions(Freeman, 1978). But why increase fringe benefits by a larger percentage than
the increase in the paid out wage? Onereasonis the higher marginal income
tax rate, if the incomeelasticityof workerdemandfor fringes is otherwise
unitary(Rice(1966 ) • Butthis explains only a small partof
the proportional increase (onsimoni and Shakotko, 1979).
The analysisof effectsof wage pushonhours mayprovidea sufficient
rationale: An increase in union wages W, with F unchanged, would lower the
ratio of marginal factor costs both by raising the denominator in the second
right hand component of equation (1) and by reducing q in its numerator. If
hours are reduced, weekly earnings may not increase much even if wage rates14
rise significantly. To blunt the adverse effect on hours, more specifically,
to prevent their reduction which would limit union gains in earnings, costs (F)
such as fringes which are partly unrelated to hours, must be increased by a
largerpercentage than the paid out wage, (w) since quit rates (q) decline. Our
evidence that union hours of work are notsignificantly shorter than hours
of (comparable) nonunion workers at least does not contradict this analysis.
In contrast to hypotheses which rely on non—wage aspects of unionism to
exslainthe larger ratio of fringe benefits to paid out wages in union employ-
ment, this analysis predicts a positive link between the percent union Wage
premiumand the relative increase in fringe benefits (F) .Moreover,the per-
centincrease inF is expected to exceed thepercentincrease
inthe wage, since the larger the latter, the bigger is the decrease in the
quitrate. Thus unions which achieve the biggest gain in paid out wages would
also want the largest proportion oftheir total compensation in fringe benefits.
Animportant consequence of higher fixed costs (in hiring and in fringes)
imposed onunion employers is greater stabilityof employment -—reduced
fluctuationsin N, when labor demand fluctuates (see Rosen, 1968). As a result,
the major means of adjustment to fluctuating demand in union employment are the
use of overtime when labor is short and the use of temporary layoffs (recall
unemployment) in slack times. Temporary layoff is favored by union workers,
as it implies lesser income loss than corresponding reductions in weekly hours,
becauseefunemloyment compensation and ether unemployment benefits
For their part, employers can expect less attrition, since temporaily laid off
unionworkers are less likely to look for other jobs thancomparable non-union
workers.15
The evidence that average weekly hours are not less in the union than
non—union sector, that overtime is more prominent and that temporary layoffs
are more frequent and a larger proportion of total layoffs in the union sector
1
is available ,butneeds to be investigated more rigorously.
(4) Wage Profiles, Turnover, and Training
Wage profiles of union members are higher and quit rates lower than
in non-union jobs. These facts are neither unrelated nor surprising. Since
the wage received in union employment exceeds the worker's opportunity wage
in non-union employment, and fringes even more so, he is less likely to quit
a union job then a non-union job. Quit rates in the union sector are about
half as large as in the non-union sector. The differences are smaller for
separations, since layoffs (much of which are recall) are larger in the
union sector-—also an implication of larger fixed labor costs, as already
observed.
Lower quit rates of union workers have been ascribed to the existence
of grievance procedures ("voice" instead of "exit") Although union wage
premia are assumed to play a part in the reduction of mobility, no direct
empirical tests have been offered. Longitudinal micro-data permit direct
tests: If unionization reduces job mobility, this reduction should be
observed on the same individual by comparing his mobility before and after
joining a union firm. And if the wage premium gained by moving to a union
firm matters, the reduction in mobility should be greater the greater the
wage gain. Tests carried out on NLSandPSID panels (Mincer, 1981) confirm
these predictions, but they leave out advantages in fringes which are not
available in the data.
'In MID, straight-time in weekly hours are about 4% shorter in union jobs,
but total hours are no less in union than in nonunion jobs. See also
B1a and Kahn (1981) ,andRaisian (1981)
2
See Freeman (1980) .Butthere is little reason to believe that similarly
effective procedures cannot be adopted in non—union firms, given the in-
centives to reduce turnover costs.16
Analyses of minimum wages (Mincer and Leighton, 1980) showed mixed effects
on turnover. Since minimum wages apply only to the paid out money component,
other components of labor costs are likely to be reduced, and this is apparently
true of training costs whether they are borne by employers or employees.
Although the initial increase in wages is likely to reduce quits, later
dilution of job training content may well increase turnover.
Although the typical union wage profile is higher in level, it is flatter
than the typical non—union profile. This difference has been found in many
studies and has been ascribed to union policy of compressing wage differentials
across firms and workers. The policy of wage compression has been attributed
to union pursuit of equity, to administrative convenience in collective bar-
gaining, and to union efforts to reduce competition from lower wage firms.
In studies of minimum wages flatter wage growth has been conjectured
and observed, and inferred to be a consequence of increased wage costs re-
placing job training expenditures. Union effects on job training are more
complex: They may be derived from union wage pressures on the entire tenure
profile of wages: Explicit and rigid rules make seniority a necessary condi-
tion for promotion in most union firms, and wage progressions are adhered to,
though they may be slowed or accelerated, along seniority lines. Such provisions
limit the supply of trained workers from other firms, and reduce incentives
for general (transferable) training.
Although specific training need not be affected, since employers can
rely on lesser quit and employees on job security afforded by seniority,
general (transferable) training is likely to be reduced. Empirical wage
functions which distinguishes between effects of work experience at fixed
levels of tenure, and of length of tenure at given levels of experience ,show
little difference in the slopes of tenure profiles of wages between union and17
and non—union workers, but a much flatter union experience profile.
Although volumes of specific training need not be affected, direct
responses in the micro—data confirm that total training is less frequent
in union firms.18
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